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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE "NICK" KIRK, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH and its 
subdivision, THE DEPARTMENT ] 
OF CORRECTIONS, ] 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) Case No. 870488 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Were the plaintiff's injuries and did the cause of 
action arise out of the incarceration of a prisoner at the Utah 
State prison within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 
(j), or if so has the State of Utah waived the governmental 
Immunity Act by insuring its self against such suits? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action brought against the State of Utah 
and its Department of Corrections for injuries suffered by a 
court bailiff who was shot during an attempted escape of 
a felon at the Courthouse in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The facts of this matter, while not tried to the court are such 
that there is no dispute as to them. 
1. One, Ronnie Lee Gardner, was a convicted felon who 
had previously escaped from the custody of the Utah State 
Prison while at the University of Utah hospital and while on 
escape allegedly murdered a man in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Gardner was recaptured and returned to the Utah 
State Prison to serve his time for the numerous serious 
felonies that he had been previously convicted of. 
3. On April 2nd, 1985, Gardner in the company of two 
prison guards was transported from the Utah State Prison at 
Draper, Utah to the Metropolitan Hall of Justice at Salt Lake 
City, Utah to attend proceedings against him stemming from the 
murder charge. 
4. Upon entering the 1st floor of the Metropolitan 
Hall of Justice, with the two guards immediately to his rear, 
Gardner was approached by a female who passed Gardner a 
loaded firearm, whereupon the two guards who were with Gardner 
immediately fled the scene and took cover behind a vehicle 
which was in the parking area of the 1st floor. One of them 
took one shot at Gardner which hit Gardner in the shoulder, 
wounding him, but not seriously. 
5. Gardner,inside the 1st floor of the courthouse 
then shot and killed an attorney in the clerk's sub-office 
located on the 1st floor and shot and critically wounded the 
plaintiff who was an unarmed court bailiff assigned to the 
Third Judicial District Court. 
6. Several minutes later Gardner made his way to the 
outside front of the Metropolitan Hall of Justice where he was 
captured by law enforcement officers. 
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7. Subsequently the plaintiff brought this action 
against the State of Utah and its Department of Corrections 
claiming that the prison guards and the Department were 
negligent, to which action the defendant filed a motion to 
dismiss. 
8. The action which had been filed in the Third 
Judicial District Court was removed to the Fourth Judicial 
District due to the plaintiff being a court bailiff of the 
Third Judicial District. 
9. Following the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss the 
Honorable Boyd L. Park rendered a written opinion dismissing 
plaintiff's complaint under the provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (j). 
10. From this order the plaintiff timely filed his 
appeal to the Supreme Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The words "arises out of" and "incarcerated" as 
used in the governmental immunity act must be read together. 
This phrase was not intended to be a shield behind which the 
State and its employees can, without regard to the safety or 
property of the citizens of this State act with respect to the 
conduct or control of persons who may be under its control and 
custody. Further, Gardner was not "incarcerated" within the 
meaning of the Statute at the time of the shooting of the 
plaintiff. 
The State by utilizing tax dollars to insure 
itsself and its employees from conduct allegedly under one of 
the exemptions of the governmental immunity Act has waived 
such immunity. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE INJURIES TO THE PLAINTIFF DID NOT 
ARISE OUT OF THE INCARCERATION OF RONNIE 
LEE GARDENER. ALSO HE WAS NOT INCARCERATED 
AT THE TIME OF THE SHOOTING OF THE PLAINTIFF 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE GOVERNMENTAL 
IMMUNITY ACT OF UTAH 
The Legislature of the State of Utah at the time that 
it enacted the governmental immunity act made certain 
exceptions to the waiver of governmental immunity which are 
generally found in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10. 
The pertinent exemption, to this case, is subsection 
(j) which provides: 
"63-30-10 (1) Immunity from suit of all 
governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or 
omission of an employee committed within the 
scope of employment except if the injury: 
(j) Arises out of the incarceration 
of any person in any state prison, county, 
or city jail or other place of legal 
confinement;" 
The issue of whether this section covers situations 
when injury or damage arises due to the conduct of a 
person who is in the custody of prison officials but who is 
not physically in the prison has been passed upon by 
the Supreme Court of Utah before, but the issue should be 
reexamined by the Court in light of new law and trends in 
holding the State or its subdivisions accountable to those who 
are injured or killed due to the negligence of the State or 
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its subdivisions. 
It is submitted that the wording of the whole statute 
must be read together and not bifurcated thus "arises out of 
the incarceration" must be read as a complete phrase. In Ward 
v. Richfield City, 716 P.2d 265 (Utah, 1986) the Court held 
"We construe a statute on the assumption 
that each term is used advisedly and that 
the intent of the Legislature is revealed 
in the use of the term in the context and 
structure in which it is placed." 
The word "incarceration" cannot stand alone, so the fact that 
Ronnie Lee Gardner was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison, 
in a technical sense, although not physically at the state 
prison when the shooting took place, is without moment. 
For the exemption under the governmental immunity act 
to be applicable the negligent act complained of must occur 
because it "arises out of" that incarceration. 
Under the facts of this case, Gardner's incarceration 
in the state prison had nothing to do with him being in the 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice. He was there because the 
Constitution and the implementing statutes of Utah required 
him to be present at all proceedings against him stemming 
from the pending murder charge. Utah Constitution, Article 1, 
§ 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-16; State v. Aikers, 87 Utah 507, 
51 P.2d 1052. 
Case law attempting to interpret what is meant by the 
words "arising out of" generally have held that there has to be 
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some causal connection between arising out of and the injury 
complained of. 
Wyoming held in Johnson v. Rothwell, 87 P.2d 13 (Wyo. 
1939) that the words "arising out of" may be used in the 
sense of "growing out of" or "created by" or "brought into 
being by". There must be some connection between arising out 
of and the cause of action. Rice v. Oriental Fireworks Co., 
707 P.2d 1250 (Oregon App. 1985). 
New Mexico in Gutierrez v. Artesia Public Schools, 
583 P.2d 476 (N.M. 1978) held that the words relate to the 
cause of the injury. 
Arizona also applies a causation factor to the use 
of "arises out of". Vanguard Insurance Company v. Cantrell 
503 P.2d 962 (Ariz. App 1973). Accord: Estate of Smith v. 
Hearon, 424 P.2d 970 (Okla 1967). 
Utah in an insurance case, Nat. Farmers U. Prop & Cas 
Co.v. Western Casualty and Surety Co., 577 P.2d 961 (Utah 1978) 
stated: 
"The term 'arising out of1 is ordinarily 
understood to mean originating from, 
incident to or connected with the item 
in question." 
It is submitted that Utah falls within the same camp as 
the other western states who have passed upon this matter. 
Applying these standards to the facts of the case 
now before the Court it is submitted that there was no 
causal connection of the incarceration of Gardner and the 
shooting of the plaintiff. 
Justice Maughan in his dissenting opinion in Epting v. 
State of Utah, 546 P.2d 242 (Utah 1976) pointed out that the 
wording of Utah Code Ann § 63-30-10 should be read carefully. 
Justice Maughan stated that the exception to the governmental 
immunity act found in sub-section (j) was to: 
" . . . prevent incarcerated persons 
from disrupting the orderly administration 
of governmental institutions where legal 
confinement, for crime or offense, is 
lawsuits by incarcerated persons, against 
supervisory personnel. It has nothing 
whatsoever to do with a third party not 
even remotely connected with incarceration." 
Justice Maughan continued on and observed: 
"thus, it would seem the phrase could 
only mean injuries arising while the 
incarcerated person was in the prison, 
or under direct control of the state, 
while laboring on a public work." 
Justice Crockett, who was on the majority side in Epting, three 
years later in Schmitt v. Billings, 600 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979) 
made the observation that although sub section (j) prevents 
a prisoner from bring suit against authorities "nevertheless 
they should be dealt^with fairly and honestly." 
Under the facts of this case, is the State dealing 
with the wounded bailiff fairly and honestly? 
In the instant case the State allowed a mad dog killer 
to run amok in a public courthouse, killing and maiming as he 
went, while the guards who allowed a woman to pass the killer 
a gun cowered behind a vehicle having run from their charge 
although they too were armed. 
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The Board of Corrections as well as the guards knew 
of Gardner's escape tries and of his crimes which included 
wanton killings and other henious crimes against society. 
There has to be a causal connection. National Farmers 
Union Property and Casualty Company v. Western Casualty and 
Surety Company, 577 P.2d 961 (Utah 1978); Taggart v. Industrial 
Commission, 79 Utah 598, 12 P.2d 356 (1932). 
It is respectfully submitted that sub-section (j) 
is only applicable where the prisoner is in the prison and 
under the control of the State. This was pointed out 
by the Court in Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92 (Utah 1978) 
wherein the Court held: 
"The plain meaning of the section 
reflects a legislative intent to 
retain sovereign immunity for any 
injuries occuring while the incarcerated 
person is in prison and under the control 
of the state." (Emphasis mine) 
It is submitted that Madsen, Schmitt, and Epting all stand 
for the proposition that the incarceration referred to in 
Utah Code Ann § 63-30-10 (j) is while jLn prison not running 
around a courthouse. 
POINT TWO 
THE MODERN TREND OF THE CASES IS 
TO HOLD THE STATE ACCOUNTABLE FOR 
NEGLIGENTLY HANDLING PRISIONERS 
The Restatement of Law, Torts, 2d § 319 states: 
"One who takes charge of a third person 
whom he knows or should know to be likely 
to cause bodily harm to others if not 
controlled is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to control the third 
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person to prevent him from doing such 
harm." 
The Comment to this section by the author states: 
(a) The rule stated in this Section is 
applicable to a sheriff or peace officer, 
a jailer or warden of a penal institution. . ." 
The trend in the nation over the last few years has 
been to charge the governmental agency and the State with 
liability where there has been negligent conduct in the 
control of known dangerous convicts and prisoners. Ryan v. 
State, 656 P.2d 597 (Ariz. 1982); Rum River Lumber Co v. 
State, 282 N.W.2d 882 (Minn. 1979); Gibson v. United States, 
(C.A., 1972) 457 F.2d 1391; Allentown State Hospital v. Gill, 
88 Pa Comwlth 331, 488 A.2d 1211 (1985). 
The Oregon Appellate Court in Christensen v. Elpley, 
585 P.2d 419 (Or App. 1978) in holding the governmental 
agency liable where a police officer was stabbed to death 
and applying § 315, Restatement of Torts, 2d, stated: 
"By undertaking to oversee incarcerated 
individuals whose escape would pose a danger 
to others, the defendant assumes a 
responsibility which places her in a special 
relationship with those persons who may be 
harmed by negligent performance of her duties. 
Whether that class includes the entire 
general public, we need not decide; it 
would include police officers who suffer 
a special danger in relation to escapees." 
Kansas has adopted the rule that the State and or its 
governmental agencies are liable for the conduct of escapees 
and prisoners. Cansler v. State, 675 P.2d 57, (Kansas, 1984); 
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Beck v, Kansas University Foundation/ 580 F. Supp 527 (D. 
Kansas 1984). This latter case cites § 319 of the Restatement 
of Torts, 2d as authority. Arizona reversed its previous 
position of no liability, in the case of Ryan v. State, 
Supra, holding that a cause of action was stated against the 
State for the conduct of an escaped youthful offender who shot 
the plaintiff with a shotgun. See: Annotation, 55 ALR3d 899. 
This author has not found any Utah cases which have 
cited the Restatement of Torts (Sections § 319 or § 315) 
but the rationale of Little v. Utah State Div. of Family 
Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983) gives credence to the 
position that Utah adheres to the law and philosophy as 
espoused by the Restatement. The duty referred to has been 
adopted by the Legislature in Utah Code Ann § 64-13-14 
which provides: 
"The department shall maintain and 
operate prison facilities for the 
custody of offenders who pose a 
danger of serious bodily harm to 
others, who cannot be controlled 
in a less secure setting, or who 
have engaged in persistent or serious 
criminal conduct." 
This position is further strengthened by the Court's 
holding in Doe v. Arguelles, 716 P.2d 279 (Utah, 1985). 
The Idaho Supreme Court in a very long opinion, 
Sterling v. Bloom, 723 P.2d 755 (Idaho 1986), in citing 
§ 319 of the Restatement (p. 770) cites Doe v. Arguelles 
and apparently assumes that Utah also adheres to § 319. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the question 
of the breach of the duty of care should be tried to the 
Court and not summarily dismissed. 
POINT THREE 
THE STATE OF UTAH WAIVED THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT BY 
INSURING ITS SELF AGAINST LOSS 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-26 and the succeeding 
sections of Utah law have established a system whereby the 
state and the various governmental entities may acquire 
insurance and have established a "Risk Management Fund" which 
is a form of self insurance (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-35). 
The insurance premiums are obtained through the 
assessment of taxes, the levy of which is not to exceed .0001 
and through the investment of such monies so collected. The 
self insurance program utilizes tax monies and the interest 
and investment proceeds and is administered by a private 
trustee (Utah Code Ann. § 63-30 28). With the adoption of 
the self insurance program a cap has been placed upon the 
amount of any recovery against the governmental agency. 
It appears that the enlightened thought as to whether 
or not the obtaining of insurance and the utilization of tax 
dollars to do so is that such actions create a waiver of the 
governmental immunity imposed by the legislatures of the 
various states. 
This trend was pointed out in Schoeing v. United 
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States Aviation Underwriters, 120 N.W.2d 859 (Minn., 1963) 
wherein the Court observed: 
"We are clearly of the view that where 
a municipality expends public funds 
for the purchase of liability insurance, 
such expendature constitutes a waiver by 
the municipality and its insurer to the 
extent of the policy coverage." 
To allow the governmental agency to acquire insurance 
utilizing public monies and then assert governmental immunity 
would be to make a gift of the public monies to the insurance 
carrier. LaMont Ind. Sch. Dist. #1-95 of Grant City v. 
Swanson 549 P.2d 215, (Okla., 1976). 
This trend can be followed from the Wyoming case of 
Collins v. Memorial Hospital of Sheridan County, 521 P.2d 1339 
(Wyo., 1974) and the Annotation of cases in 68 ALR2d 1437 and 
71 ALR3d 6 § 25 when the up-dates are read show the trend of 
the Courts around the United States with respect to this 
matter. It is conceded that the courts are sharply divided 
and it is difficult to discern a majority view. Hinchey v. 
Ogden, 307 S„E.2d 891 (Va., 1983). Utah has not directly 
ruled one way or the other. 
It is respectfully submitted that dicta in Standiford 
v. Salt Lake City, 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980) would seem to 
indicate the direction that the Court will go. Justice 
Stewart observed: 
"Because the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act authorizes the procurance of governmental 
insurance protection, the governmental entities 
may sensibly budget to include insurance 
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premiums for tort claims arising out of the 
operation of such things as public golf 
courses." 
In the matter now before the Court, plaintiff, with 
the permission of the Court, filed an amended complaint 
alleging the existence of insurance in this matter. 
Defendant's motion to dismiss in effect admits this 
allegation, at for the purposes of the motion. Petersen v. 
Jones, 16 Utah 2d 121, 396 P.2d 748; Heathman v. Hatch, 13 
Utah 2d 266, 372 P.2d 990. 
Colorado in Mason v. State, 689 P.2d 199 (Colo App., 
1984) held that as the State had obtained insurance, the 
State was liable for the murder of a man by a parolee as the 
procurement constituted a waiver of governmental immunity. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that when the exemption 
provision of Utah Code Ann § 63-30-10 (j) is read as a single 
phrase it is obvious that before the act complained of falls 
within the perview of the exemption there must be a causal 
connection between the act complained of and the incarceration 
of a prisoner. In the instant case there is no such causal 
connection. Clearly, under the law the State should answer 
for the negligence of its employees and agency. To spend 
tax dollars on insurance coverage and then deny liability 
under the governmental immunity act is to squander the 
public monies on a useless thing. Certainly, the Utah 
State Legislature did not intend such a result. 
The ruling of the District Court dismissing 
plaintiff's complaint should be reversed and this matter 
remanded for trial on its merit. 
ULLY SUBMITTED, 
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Attorney for Appellant 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
********* 
GEORGE "Nick" KIRK, 
: Civil No. CV-87873 
Plaintiff, 
-vs- RULING 
STATE OF UTAH, et al. : BOYD L. PARK, JUDGE 
Defendants. 
********* 
This matter came regularly before the court for hearing on 
Thursday, August 13, 1987, on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
based upon sovereign immunity pursuant to 63-30-1 et seq. 
Paul N. Cotro-Manes esq. represented Plaintiff. Christopher 
C. Fuller esq. represented Defendants. The Court, having 
heard oral arguments of counsel in the premises, having read 
the Motion to Dismiss, the Memoranda in Support of the Motion, 
and the Memoranda in Opposition to the Motion, makes the 
following Findings and Ruling: 
FINDINGS 
1. On April 2, 1985, during an escape attempt at the Salt 
Lake Metropolitan Hall of Justice, prison inmate Ronnie 
Lee Gardner shot bailiff George "Nick" Kirk, plaintiff 
herein, in the stomach. 
On January 12, 1987, Plaintiff filed this negligence action 
against the State of Utah and the Utah State Department of 
Corrections. 
On February 9, 1987, defendants filed a motion to dismiss 
this action based on the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
63-30-1 et seq. 
Section 63-30-3 of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
which expressly provides for the continuance of sovereign 
immunity for any injury resulting from the exercise of a 
governmental function "except as otherwise provided in this 
chapter," indicates an intention that the act be strictly 
applied to preserve sovereign immunity. Holt v. Utah State 
Road Commission, 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1973). 
Section 63-30-2(4) of the Utah Sovereign Immunity Act 
defines "Governmental function" as: 
any act or failure to act, operation, function, or under-
taking of a governmental entity whether or not the act 
or failure to act, operation, function, or undertaking 
is characterized as a governmental, proprietary, a core 
governmental function, unique to government, undertaken 
in a dual capacity, essential or not essential to a 
government or government function, or could be performed 
by private enterprise. 
By delivering inmate Ronnie Lee Gardner to the court, the 
defendant's employees were clearly engaged in a governmental 
function within the meaning of 63-30-2(4) and the fact that 
2 Addendum: Page 17 
that such activity could be performed by private enterprise 
does not alter that result. 
7. Section 63-30-10(1) expressly waives governmental immunity 
from suit for injury proximately caused by a negligent act 
or omission of an employee committed within the scope of his 
authority except for certain enumerated exceptions. 
8. One exception expressly retains governmental immunity if the 
injury "arises out of the incarceration of any person in any 
state prison . . ." Section 63-30-10(1) (j) U.C.A 1953, as 
amended; previously numbered as 63-30-10(10). 
9. The plain meaning of that section reflects a legislative 
intent to retain sovereign immunity for any injuries 
occurring while the incarcerated person is in prison 
and under the control of the state. Madsen v. State, 
583 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978). 
10. The fact that ^ inmate Ronnie Lee Gardner was brought to 
the Salt Lake Metropolitan Hall of Justice for court 
proceedings does not change the fact that Gardner was 
an inmate incarcerated at the Utah State Prison who 
was under the control of the state. 
11. The governmental entity is immune "unless immunity is 
expressly waived in one of the succeeding sections of 
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the . . . Act," Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627, 
631 (Utah 1983)(emphasis added), and a waiver of that 
immunity cannot be implied solely by the fact a state 
has chosen to purchase insurance coverage. 
12. This court recognizes that sovereign immunity is a harsh 
doctrine which effectively deprives the plaintiff of his 
remedy for actual injuries suffered. The court further 
acknowledges that, while several states are currently 
restricting sovereign immunity, the State of Utah seems 
to be reinforcing sovereign imminity. However, this 
court is not the appropriate forum to change the policy 
of the Utah State Legislature nor the rulings of the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
RULING 
1. Defendant's are immune from this suit pursuant to Section 
63-30-10(1)(j) of the ,Utah State Governmental Immunity Act, 
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss this action is granted. 
Dated this 4th day of November, 1987. 
BY THE COURT 
BOYD t . PARK ^ "DISTRICT JUDGE 
c c : Paul N. Cotro-Manes e s q . 
Chr i s topher C. F u l l e r e s q . 
Brent A. Burnett, esa. 
4 
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ADDENDA 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
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ADDENDA 
UTAH CODE ANN § 63-30-10 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions — 
Waiver for injury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, mali-
cious prosecution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, 
deceit, interference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or 
civil rights; or 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or by 
the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, li-
cense, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization; or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making 
an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property; or 
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution of any judicial or admin-
istrative proceeding, even if malicious or without probable cause; or 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it 
is negligent or intentional; or 
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public dem-
onstrations, mob violence, and civil disturbances; or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the collection of and assessment 
of taxes; or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah National Guard; or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person in any state prison, 
county, or city jail or other place of legal confinement; or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state lands or the result of any 
activity authorized by the State Land Board; or 
(1) arises out of the activities of providing emergency medical assis-
tance, fighting fire, handling hazardous materials, or emergency evacua-
tions. 
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused or arising out of a violation of protected fourth amend-
ment rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall be the exclusive 
remedy for injuries to those protected rights. If § 78-16-5 or Subsection 
77-35-12(g) or any parts thereof are held invalid or unconstitutional, this 
Subsection (2) shall be void and governmental entities shall remain immune 
from suit for violations of fourth amendment rights. 
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